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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellees (the "Judds") argue that the court must review the
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") under
a "reasonableness and rationality" standard and take the position
that the court may not reverse the Commission's Final Decision and
Order unless the court finds the decision to have been arbitrary
and capricious.

It is appellant's position that the correct

standard is "correction of error".

The issue in dispute is not a

factual issue, nor is it a mixed issue of fact and law; it is a
purely legal issue and the Commission's ruling is entitled to no
deference from this court on review.

The facts in this case are

not in dispute. It is the legal effect of those facts which gives
rise to the controversy in this matter.
The Judds also argue that the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel are inapplicable in cases determining tax
liabilities in different years and, therefore, the legal conclusion
of the Third District Court concerning "separation" of the Judds'
building lots from the remainder of their agricultural property
should be given no force or effect. Appellant asserts that it has
been judicially determined, after a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue, that the Judds' improved building

lots,

although physically adjacent, were "separated" from the remaining
agricultural property, within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-97
1

(Supp. 1975) (now codified at U.C.A. § 59-5-510 (Supp. 1987).

No

evidence was produced which would justify a change in that legal
conclusion. The Judds and the Commission take the position that no
factual change need be shown because every tax year is a clean
slate and prior judicial determinations are irrelevant.
POINT I
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE LAW
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND THIS COURT MAY
GRANT RELIEF UNDER THE CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD
In their responsive brief, the Judds acknowledge that agency
decisions, such as the one on appeal here, which involve pure
questions of law are entitled to no deference to the agency's
decision on appeal.

Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial

Comm. of Utah, 767 P. 2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).

Citing Bennett v.

Industrial Comm'n. , 726 P. 2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), this court
explained:
"We do not defer to the Commission when
construing statutory terms or when applying statutory terms to the facts unless
the construction of the statutory language or the application of the law to
the facts should be subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned from its
accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the subject matter."
The correction-of-error standard also applies
when the issue is one of basic legislative
intent.
In Big K Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n.. 689 P. 2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984), we
held that no deference was due agency conBTP3.022/Judd
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struction of "statutory or case law" or of its
organic statute unless it is clear that the
agency is in a superior position by virtue of
expertise to give effect to "the regulatory
objective to be achieved."
[Citation omitted.]
767 P.2d, at 527.
Rejecting the appellee7s argument that the applicable standard
was one of reasonableness, the Hurley court noted:
The facts here are not in dispute. Nor is
there dispute about the application of the law
to the facts. The real dispute is solely,
what does the law require?
. . . That is a
straightforward issue of statutory construction. Resolution of the issue would not be
aided by agency expertise, and no term of art
is at issue. Indeed, it is the courts that
have expertise in matters of this nature, not
an administrative agency. [Citation omitted.]
Of course, the statute and regulations, once
properly construed, must be applied to the
facts of the case, but that does not make the
issue one of mixed law and fact. There is, in
short, no reason to accord the Board a zone of
reasonableness in its construction of the law.
The Board either read the statute and regulations correctly, or it did not.
767 P.2d, at 528.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Judds' building
lots are physically

adjacent to their remaining

agricultural

property. See Brief of Appellee, p. 6, f 7. It is undisputed that
in 1980 the Judds entered into an agreement to sell a portion of
their property and received, as partial consideration, 16 building
lots, improved with curb and gutter, sewer and utility hookups.
BTP3.022/Judd
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See Brief of Appellee, p. 5, 5 4. It is undisputed that the Judds7
property, with the exception of the improved building lots, qualify
for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act.

See Brief of

Appellee, p. 8, I 14.
The issue, then, is whether there has been a "separation" of
the improved building lots from the remainder of the Judds7
property, within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-510 (Supp. 1987).
That issue is a purely a question of law.
The Commission7s ruling does not specifically address the
issue, but does acknowledge that "prior decisions" denied the
Judds7 request for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act.
The Commission then erroneously concludes that the principles of
collateral estoppel do not bar relitigation of the issues which
were litigated and resolved against the Judds by the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County.
The authorities upon which the Judds rely are inapposite in
the present case.

Johnson v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 782 P. 2d

965 (Utah App. 1989), involved a challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence to support an agency7s factual findings that an employee
was

discharged

for

"just

cause" after

testing

positive

for

marijuana use and the weight to be given the testimony of expert
witnesses.

Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd.. 799 P.2d 1163

(Utah 1990), centered on a dispute concerning the fair market value
BTP3.022/Judd
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and expense ratio of bank property and the only issue on appeal was
the accuracy of the Tax Commission's factual findings.
1165.

Id. at

Cottonwood Hts., etc. v. Bd. of Com'rs., etc.. 593 P.2d 138

(Utah 1979) and Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984), both involve challenges to local zoning and
planning decisions.

In both cases, the factual findings of the

agencies were the subject of the controversies.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR
DECISIONS AND THE COMMISSION'S HANDBOOK
Should the court determine that the correct standard of review
is not correction-of-error, appellant urges the court to determine
that the Commission's decision is, in fact, arbitrary and capricious in that it is inconsistent with the Commission's prior
decisions and the Commission has failed to set forth facts and
reasons demonstrating a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency, as required by U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(4).
As noted in appellant's opening brief, the Commission prepared
and distributed a publication entitled "Assessor's Handbook, The
Assessment of Agricultural Land Under the Farmland Assessment Act"
(November 1987) (the "Handbook").

This Handbook was prepared to

respond to questions of county assessors and establish uniform
guidelines regarding qualification of property for preferential
BTP3.022/Judd
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assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act.

The publication is

prepared in a "question and answer" format.

The portion of the

Handbook which specifically deals with the issue presented in the
instant case appears on page 16 (R. 255):
Q

Can a portion of agricultural land previously included under the Act be subdivided without affecting the qualification of
the remaining agricultural land?

A

As long as the remaining agricultural
land complies with FAA standards, it can
still be taxed under the provisions of
the act. (NOTE: The portion subdivided
will become subject to the applicable
roll-back tax (see section 52-2-506).
The assessor may require an affidavit of
eligibility for the remaining acreage.

Relying on the guidelines established by the Commission and
upon the Commission's prior legal conclusion (affirmed by the Third
District Court) that the building lots had been "separated" from
the Judds' agricultural property when the subdivision plat was
recorded, appellant denied FAA status to the improved building lots
owned by the Judds.

The Commission's Final Decision and Order

completely ignores its own Handbook and finds, without explanation,
that the prior decisions are not controlling.
The Judds make much of the fact that the improved building
lots are adjacent to the portion of their property which undisputedly qualifies for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act.
What the Judds and the Commission ignore, however, is that the

BTP3.022/Judd
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property has not changed location since the Third District Court
determined, as a matter of law, that a "separation" has occurred,
affirming the prior decision of the Commission.

The improved

building lots are also adjacent to other building lots within the
Vistawest Subdivision and are, in fact, encompassed within that
subdivision, according to the official plat recorded

in the

official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
The Commission's failure to adequately justify this departure
from its prior practice —
Handbook —

from the guidelines established by its

is arbitrary and capricious.
POINT III
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN
TO THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION
AND THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT

Relying upon Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen. 333
U.S. 591 (1948) and Mountain States, etc. v. Salt Lake City, 596
P. 2d 649 (Utah 1979), the Judds argue that collateral estoppel
and/or res judicata

are inapplicable

in cases

liabilities incurred in different years.

involving tax

While holding this

proposition to be generally true, the United States Supreme Court,
in Sunnen, supra, articulated the exception:
. . . Income taxes are levied on an annual
basis.
Each year is the origin of a new
liability and of a separate cause of action.
Thus if a claim of liability or non-liability
relating to a particular tax year is litiBTP3.022/Judd
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gated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving
the same claim and the same tax year. But if
the later proceeding is concerned with a
similar or unlike claim relating to a different tax year, the prior judgment acts as a
collateral estoppel only as to those matters
in the second proceeding which were actually
presented and determined in the first suit.
Collateral estoppel operates, in other words,
to relieve the government and the taxpayer of
"redundant litigation of the identical question of the statute's application to the
taxpayer's status." [Citation omitted.]
But collateral estoppel is a doctrine
capable of being applied so as to avoid an
undue disparity in the impact of income tax
liability. A taxpayer may secure a judicial
determination of a particular tax matter, a
matter which may recur without substantial
variation for some years thereafter. But a
subsequent modification of the significant
facts or a change or development in the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at least for
future purposes. If such a determination is
then perpetuated each succeeding year as to
the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment different
from that given to other taxpayers of the same
class. As a result, there are inequalities in
the administration of the revenue laws, discriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and
a fertile basis for litigious confusion.
[Citation omitted.] Such consequences, however, are neither necessitated nor justified by
the principle of collateral estoppel. That
principle is designed to prevent repetitious
lawsuits over matters which have once been
decided and which have remained substantially
static, factually and legally.
It is not
meant to create vested rights in decisions
that have become obsolete or erroneous with
time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers.
BTP3.022/Judd
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And so where two cases involve income
taxes in different years, collateral estoppel
must be used with its limitations carefully in
mind so as to avoid injustice. It must be
confined to situations where the matter raised
in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged. [Citation
omitted.] If the legal matters determined in
the earlier case differ from those raised in
the second case, collateral estoppel has no
bearing on the situation. [Citation omitted.]
And where the situation is vitally altered
between the time of the first judgment and the
second, the prior determination is not
conclusive. . . .
333 U.S., at 598-600.
Applying the Sunnen criteria, appellant must establish (1)
that the issue decided in connection with the Judds' appeal of
their 1985 assessment is identical to the issue raised here, (2)
that the controlling facts have not changed, and (3) that the legal
rules applicable to the situation are unaltered.

The record in

this case establishes each of these elements and the Commission did
not articulate any basis for disregarding either its prior decision
or the decision of the Third Judicial District Court.
In 1985, as now, the improved building lots were adjacent to
the Judds' agricultural property; there were no physical barriers
separating

the property.

In proceedings

interpreting

those

circumstances, both the Commission and the court reviewing the
Commission's prior ruling determined
BTP3.022/Judd
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that a "separation" had

occurred within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-510 and, as a result
of that separation, the improved building lots must qualify for
assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act, standing alone, or
must make a substantial contribution
operation,

if

utilized

in

connection

to the overall
with

other

farming

qualifying

property. Nothing in the law and nothing in the factual situation
has so altered that these prior determinations may be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The Final Decision and Order of the Commission is clearly
erroneous in its application of the law to the facts of this case.
The Commission's refusal to give collateral estoppel effect to its
own prior decision and the decision of the Third District Court is
clearly erroneous.

This court should exercise its authority to

correct the errors of the Commission and reinstate the determination of the appellant, denying appellees assessment under the
Farmland Assessment Act.
DATED this

day of October, 1991.
DAVID YOCOM
Sal£__Laj£e County A t t o r n e y

-B^L TtfCWfAS PEfERS
'
Special Deputy County Attorney
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